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Abstract 
Beginning in the 1980’s over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives began trading in 
large amounts. Their trading volume grew rapidly, to a total notional value of $88.2tn by 
the end of 1999; their gross market value was about $2.8tn.1 However, since such large 
amounts of money are at stake in the OTC derivatives market, gaps in the regulatory 
framework and standards have the potential to cause large financial losses, which have 
that ability to undermine confidence in the financial system. As a result, there has been an 
ongoing debate in the United States about the proper role for regulation in the market for 
derivatives. In order to properly asses a regulatory approach, legislators and market 
participants must have thorough knowledge in derivatives and understand the market 
effectively. The derivatives market is vast with different derivative instruments that are 
traded on exchanges and over OTC markets. The large amounts of derivatives trading, 
and their potential threat to the stability of the global financial system, needs to be 
monitored by an effective regulatory framework that promotes growth and innovation 
and prevents risks and market failures. The successful role of the private sector in 
creating standardization and stability within the OTC derivatives market suggests that 
this type of framework could be successful in monitoring the market.  
 
1 John O. Matthews and  Cathy A. Rusinko, “Regulation in the US OTC derivatives market: Towards a 
more collaborative framework,” Derivatives Use, Trading & Regulation 7.4 (2002): 337.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Derivates are “financial contracts whose value is linked to the price of an 
underlying commodity, asset, rate, index or the occurrence or magnitude of an event.”2
These instruments can be used for hedging, speculating, arbitraging price differences, and 
adjusting portfolios. Derivatives allow end-users the ability to manage their risks 
associated with holding increasingly larger portfolios of diverse financial assets because 
there is no underlying ownership of assets.3
Derivatives include different financial instruments such as futures, forwards, 
options and swaps. They are categorized according to whether they are standardized or 
customized to meet specific end users' needs. Standardized derivatives are traded through 
organized exchanges and called exchange-traded derivatives.4 These types of derivatives 
involve “varying degrees of order exposure, trade transparency, audit trails, 
clearinghouses and other attributes.”5 Derivatives can also be traded in over-the-counter 
markets (OTC). These OTC derivatives are privately negotiated by the parties involved. 
The developers and traders of OTC derivatives are large banks and securities firms, and 
the end-users are financial institutions, corporations, and some high net worth 
individuals.6
Derivatives vary in size, duration, complexity and purpose. Some are referred to 
as "plain vanilla" instruments, such as simple currency swaps.7 Others are highly 
 
2 Randall Dodd, “The Structure of OTC Derivatives Markets,” The Financier 9 (2002): 41.  
3 Matthews and Rusinko 337.  
4 Matthews and Rusinko 338.  
5 Dodd 44.  
6 Matthews and Rusinko 338. 
7 Dodd 42.  
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complicated allocations of cash flows, and can span periods of 20 years or more. Some 
complex derivatives are attached to or imbedded in other financial instruments.  
 In June 2005, the gross market value of outstanding OTC derivatives was 
$10.7 trillion, as measured by the Bank of International Settlements, a Switzerland-based 
clearinghouse for central banks.8 This represented an 83% increase from the year before. 
Also, the notional amount from these derivatives “jumped to $270.1 trillion, nearly 23% 
ahead of the prior year” and another $57.8 trillion came from “exchange listed futures 
and options [transactions]…a 24% jump from the year earlier.”9 The continuously 
growing derivative market has the potential to generate a lot of profit and risk. 
Economists and government regulators are concerned about the future development of 
this market and are interested in creating a proper regulatory approach that will be able to 
react to changes and prevent market failures. One solution to the regulatory debate is the 
reliance on the private sector to monitor and oversee the market. Private regulation 
through standard setting agencies and policy groups is successful in responding to 
changes within derivative markets and in creating standardization. Greater choice and 
flexibility is important for users of derivatives and such an environment is fostered under 
private legislation. In comparison to public regulation of derivatives, which stifles 
innovation and growth, and complete deregulation, which doesn’t protect against risks, 
oversight by the private sector is a successful tool for monitoring OTC markets.  
Derivatives Market 
The overall market in derivative instruments, particularly OTC derivatives, has 
grown enormously in recent years and continues to do so. Derivatives are useful 
 
8 Ben Mattlin, “Derived Value,” Global Finance 20.6 (2000): 33.  
9 Mattlin 33.  
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structures that provide a lot of benefits to market participants. Besides that large profits 
that can be made, derivative transactions pay out when certain events occur, such as when 
an underlying stock reaches a particular price. Derivatives can be structured in many 
different ways and are therefore a way of transferring market risk.10 
The derivatives market does not create risk but instead shifts risk that already 
exists. Whether derivatives enhance a company's safety or increase its risks depends on 
how the instruments are used, and on what happens in the market during the term of the 
contract.11 By allowing a corporation to control its financial risk exposure, derivatives 
help many companies operate more efficiently and safely. Hedging some market risk can 
be an inexpensive way to enhance long-term shareholder values.12 However, derivatives 
can be used in a manner that increases risks for an end-user. Companies need to pay more 
attention to internal corporate practices by their management and board members to make 
sure that risks are not being increased through unwise derivatives usage.13 Directors and 
managers have a responsibility to know and control the degree to which the shareholders' 
net worth is being put at risk. Many corporations lack the systems for risk modeling and 
control. One way to reduce the risk of exposure to derivatives is to understand the 
background and function of these products.  
What are Credit Derivatives? 
Credit derivatives have revolutionized the way in which banks and other financial 
institutions manage their credit risk.14 A credit derivative is a type of derivative that is 
designed to transfer credit risk from the person exposed to that risk, a protection buyer, to 
 
10 Mattlin 33.  
11 Richard C. Breeden, “Regulating the derivatives market,” Corporate Board 15.88 (1994): 1.  
12 Breeden 1.  
13 Matthews and Rusinko 339.  
14 Antulio N. Bomfim, "Understanding Credit Derivatives and their Potential to Synthesize Riskless Assets," 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2001):50. 
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a person willing to take on that risk, a protection seller.15 A credit derivative derives its 
price from the credit quality of a bond, loan, or group of financial obligations of an 
underlying reference entity. 
Credit risk is the risk that the borrower of a loan or the issuer of securities will 
default in the performance of its obligations or become insolvent.16 Credit derivatives can 
be used to reduce a lender’s or investor’s exposure to the default or insolvency of 
borrowers and issuers. As Ali and Robbe explain, “in contrast to traditional methods of 
credit risk management, credit derivatives disaggregate the credit risk from loans and 
securities, thus enabling lenders and investors to transfer the credit risk independently 
while retaining the economic benefit of their loans and investments.”17 
A market participant who is exposed to the credit risk of a given corporation can 
hedge such an exposure by buying protection in the credit derivatives market.18 There are 
many types of credit derivatives products with their own legal form and specific risk 
profile. These instruments can be OTC transactions as well as exchange traded products. 
OTC transactions are bilateral contracts designed to meet the specific requirements of the 
parties. Their main benefit, compared to exchange traded transactions, is flexibility. 
There are four common types of credit derivatives: credit default swaps, asset swap, total 
return swaps, and credit linked notes.  
 The most common credit derivative is a credit default swap. A credit default swap 
(CDS) is similar to an insurance policy. One counterparty sells insurance and the other 
counterparty buys insurance against the default of the third party. A protection buyer 
 
15 Breeden 3.  
16 Bomfim 52. 
17 Paul U. Ali and Jan Job de Vries Robbe, “New Frontiers in Credit Derivatives,” Journal of Banking 
Regulation 6.2 (2005): 177.  
18 Bomfim 58.  
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purchases protection against default risk of assets. The protection buyer pays a periodic 
fee, and receives payment from the protection seller in the event of a default.19 If a 
default occurs, the buyer of the insurance has the right to sell the bonds or other assets 
issued by the company for their face value, and the seller of the insurance agrees to buy 
the bonds for their face value.20 The buyer of the CDS makes periodic payments to the 
seller until the end of the life of the CDS or until a default occurs.  
An example of a credit default swap can be when two counterparties, counterparty 
A and an investor, enter into a two-year credit default swap. They specify a reference 
asset, which is a credit risky bond issued by a third-party corporation. This bond has two 
years remaining maturity and is trading at par value. Counterparty A agrees to make 
regular fixed payments for two years to the investor. If the third party defaults within 
those two years, counterparty A makes his regular fixed payment to the investor and sells 
the bond to the investor in exchange for the bond’s par value plus interest.  
 Moorad Choudhry and Frank J. Fabozzi state that “credit default swaps are 
important and useful because the absence of ownership and the economic risk of the 
underlying assets provide significant additional flexibility in bank balance sheet 
management, as well as for hedging and arbitrage transactions.”21 The value of this 
flexibility can be seen in the growth of the credit derivatives market.  
In the event of default, CDSs can be settled physically or in cash, with the 
settlement choice determined when entering the contract. In a physically settled swap, the 
 
19 Douglas Lucas, Laurie Goodman, and Frank J. Fabozzi, “A Closer Look at Default  
Rates on Structured Finance Securities.” Journal of Fixed Income 14.2 (2004): 46.  
20 Lucas, Goodman, and Fabozzi 46.  
21 Moorad Choudhry and Frank J. Fabozzi, “Originating Collateralized Debt Obligations  
for Balance Sheet Management,” Journal of Structured and Project Finance (2003): 41. 
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protection buyer has the right to sell the defaulted assets to the protection seller for their 
face value. In a cash settled swap, the counterparty determines the recovery value of the 
defaulted assets, and the protection seller is responsible for the difference between face 
and recovery values. These transactions are based on standardized contracts incorporating 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) standard definitions. 
Standardization of documentation helps create liquidity in the credit risk that is being 
traded.22 The use of master agreements by the ISDA is now a common market practice, 
reducing legal risk and setup and negotiation costs.  However, some ambiguity still exists 
in the standardized documentation as to what constitutes the legal definition of a default 
event.  
An asset swap is another example of a credit derivative. Asset swaps allow 
investors to take credit positions regarding a particular issuer. In an asset swap, an 
investor can buy a fixed-rate liability issued by a reference entity and simultaneously 
enter an interest rate swap where the fixed-rate and payment dates exactly match those of 
the fixed-rate liability.23 The floating rate in such a swap is the spread over short-term 
LIBOR. The end result of an asset swap is “a synthetic floating-rate liability issued by the 
reference entity, which means that the investor transferred the interest rate risk of the 
fixed-rate liability to its asset swap counterparty, retaining only the credit risk 
component.”24 
Another type of credit derivatives is a total return swap. In a total return swap, an 
investor enters into a derivatives contract where he will receive all the cash flows 
 
22 Breeden 8. 
23 Bomfim 59. 
24 Bomfim 59.  
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associated with a given reference asset without ever owning the asset.25 In exchange for 
cash flows, the investor makes periodic payments to its derivatives counterparty. If the 
issuer of the reference asset defaults during the term of the total return swap, the investor 
sustains the associated loss. At maturity of the total return swap, the total return payer 
pays the difference between the price of the reference asset and its price at the start date 
of the contract.  
Credit-linked notes (CLNs) are debt obligations with an embedded credit 
derivative. They can be issued either directly by bank or by highly rated special purpose 
vehicles created by dealers. The coupon payments made by CLNs transfers the cash flow 
of a credit derivatives contract to individual investors. 26 
The credit derivatives market that has grown in recent years is small compared to 
the overall derivatives market, and it has not yet reached the liquidity, transparency, 
standardization, and widespread market participation of more mature markets.27 The 
credit derivatives market’s prospect of continued growth, greater standardization of 
market practices, and improvements in counterparty credit risk, point to their significant 
benefits for financial markets in the future. In addition to efficiency gains in the pricing 
and distribution of credit risk, the credit derivatives market may eventually become 
sufficiently developed to allow for the large scale creation of synthetic assets that are free 
from default risk.28 
TRADING ENVIRONMENTS 
Exchange Markets 
 
25 Bomfim 60.  
26 Bomfim 60. 
27 Bomfim 66.  
28 Bomfim 66.  
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In an exchange market, trading is conducted through open outcry and carried out 
through brokers and not dealers. Because of recent advances in technology, exchanges 
began using electronic trading platforms that automatically match the bids and offers 
from market participants to execute trades in a multilateral environment.29 
One of the main features of derivatives traded by exchanges is standardization. 
Standardization makes sure that every contract is the same in terms of what, how much, 
when, and where a commodity is to be delivered. It is also an important feature because it 
allows a trader, for example, who has sold a contract to deliver a stock, to get out of the 
market by buying a contract to deliver that stock. If he sells the stock for more than he 
bought it, he profits. Otherwise he loses money.  
In addition, exchanges also offer a trading platform and a clearing system. The 
trading platform is the mechanism by which buyers and sellers are brought together and 
orders are matched.30 The difference between open outcry and electronic trading is the 
method by which trades are matched. In open outcry, trades are matched by the ability of 
traders on the floor to locate other traders who have an opposite trading interest. In 
electronic trading, a computer takes the place of traders and matches bids and offers on 
the other side of the market.  
Clearinghouses also play a role in exchanges by becoming the buyer to each seller 
and the seller to each buyer of every futures and options contract traded on the 
exchange.31 The clearinghouse is usually a division of a commodity exchange. Once a 
trade has occurred on the exchange floor or electronic trading system, the information 
 
29 Dodd 43.  
30 Gregory Kuserk et al., “Derivatives and Risk Management in the Petroleum, Natural Gas, and Electricity 
Industries,” Energy Information Administration October 2002, 3 December 2206  
< http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/derivative/index.html>. 
31 Kuserk et al.  
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from the trade is sent to the clearinghouse for confirmation.32 The clearinghouse checks 
that the information provided by the two parties matches exactly. If it does, the 
clearinghouse takes the opposite side of each counterparty that entered into the trade on 
the exchange.  
The main purpose of a clearinghouse is to create liquidity by taking the other side 
of each contract, which makes it easy for parties to enter and exit contracts.33 Without 
this structure, counterparties would have had to negotiate with the original counterparty 
any early terminations of the contracts or would have needed to ask permission to 
substitute a different party to take on the contract.34 Since the clearinghouse gets rid of 
these concerns, counterparties on exchanges can freely enter and exit the market.  
Over-the-Counter Markets 
The OTC markets are organized different from exchange markets. There are three 
types of markets: a traditional dealer market, an electronically brokered market, and a 
proprietary trading platform market.35 The OTC markets are organized around one or 
more dealers who "make a market" by maintaining bid and offer quotes to market 
participants.36 In this type of market, the end users of derivatives look for companies that 
create customized contracts to fit their needs. The dealers then offset the risk of the 
contracts by entering into exchange-traded futures and option contracts or other OTC 
derivative contracts that have an opposite risk profile.37 The dealer market is made up of 
mostly large investment banks and some commercial banks. However, as the market has 
 
32 Kuserk et al. 
33 Kuserk et al. 
34 Kuserk et al. 
35 Dodd 44. 
36 Dodd 44.  
37 Kuserk et al. 
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matured, specialized companies have moved into niches where they may have an 
informational or operational advantage over the banks. 
In OTC markets, counterparties are able to negotiate on contract terms such as the 
price, maturity, and size of the contract in order to customize the contract to meet their 
economic needs. Also, because OTC contracts are entered into on a principal-to-principal 
basis, each counterparty is exposed to the credit risk of the opposite party. The 
negotiation of execution prices are generally conducted over the telephone or through the 
use of electronic bulletin boards by the dealers for posting their quotes.38 
New technologies have been adapted to create an electronic brokering platform 
that allows for a multilateral trading environment.39 In an OTC market organized through 
an electronic brokering platform, the firm operating the platform acts only as a broker 
and does not take a position through the system. However, if the electronic brokering 
platform uses a clearinghouse then it can act as a counterparty and takes on positions. 
This occurs because the clearinghouse assumes all the credit risk of trades that are made 
through the electronic brokering platform and reported to the clearinghouse.40 
Another type of trading environment is a derivatives dealer who sets up his own 
proprietary electronic trading platform. In this arrangement, the bids and offers are posted 
exclusively by the dealer and other market participants observe these quotes. This is a 
one-way multilateral environment because only the dealer's quotes are seen. Because the 
dealer is the counterparty to every trade, the dealer assumes the credit risk in the market. 
According to the Commodity Exchange Act, this type of trading environment is not 
 
38 Dodd 46.  
39 Dodd 48. 
40 Dodd 48.  
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considered a trading facility because “the bids and offers can not be posted by all the 
participants and thus not all participants can trade within this system.”41 
OTC derivatives and exchange-traded futures can be used as substitutes for each 
other because they serve similar economic functions and may compete in the 
marketplace. They are not perfect substitutes because of differences in their contract 
terms, transaction costs, regulations, and other factors. OTC derivatives and exchange-
traded futures can also complement each other. For example, swaps dealers use 
exchange-traded futures to hedge the residual risk from unmatched positions in their 
swaps portfolios.42 Similarly, commercial firms can use exchange-traded futures to hedge 
their forward positions.  
Contracts traded on exchanges offer high liquidity and low credit risk, but are 
standardized and inflexible, causing users to face large basis risk when hedging. Dodd 
explains that “by being able to negotiate contract terms, users can reduce basis risk by 
assuring that the terms of derivative contracts more closely match the characteristics of 
their physical market positions; however, the advantage of customization generally 
comes at the expense of liquidity and credit assurances.”43 There are advantages and 
disadvantages to both types of markets for derivatives trading.  
CURRENT DERIVATIVES REGULATION IN THE US  
Regulation of Exchange-Traded Derivatives 
The regulation of derivative trading in the United States depends on whether 
trading is done on an exchange and whether the trader is a bank, an insurance company, 
or another regulated entity. Regulation of the futures and options markets is 
 
41 Dodd 48.  
42 Kuserk et al. 
43 Dodd 49.  
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accomplished through self-regulation by the exchanges and oversight by the Federal 
Government through the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).44 In the 
legislation establishing the CFTC, Kuserk et al. explains that Congress sought to assure 
orderly futures markets, operating fairly, with prices free of distortion.45 
The CFTC oversees the enforcement of exchange rules and conducts its own 
surveillance of trading in futures and related cash markets as part of its mission to prevent 
market abuse and to enhance market operations). The Commission oversees the 
regulations and rules of the futures exchanges and requires exchanges to enforce them. 
The CFTC also relies on its economists and trading experts to monitor contracts and 
trading in the public interest, to assure that markets provide a means for managing and 
assuming price risks, discovering prices, or distributing pricing information through 
trading in liquid, fair, and financially secure trading facilities.46 
In addition to regulation by the Federal Government, futures trading is overseen 
by the National Futures Association (NFA), a “registered futures association” under the 
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) that has been authorized by the Commission to register 
all categories of persons and firms dealing with customers.47 Before registering a new 
person or firm, the NFA conducts a thorough background check of the applicant to 
determine whether they should be allowed to conduct commodity business.  
Commodity exchanges follow Federal regulation along with their own rules for the 
conduct of their markets. These rules can include: covering clearance of trades, trade 
orders and records, position limits, price limits, disciplinary actions, floor trading 
 
44 Kuserk et al. 
45 Kuserk et al. 
46 Kuserk et al. 
47 Kuserk et al. 
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practices, and standards of business conduct.48 A new or amended exchange rule must be 
reported to the CFTC, which may also direct an exchange to change its rules and 
practices.  
Under the CEA, trading of futures and options on CFTC-approved exchanges is 
the exclusive form of permissible trading, without a specific exemption or exclusion. The 
CFTC, in 1993, granted several exemptions for OTC derivative contracts. The first 
exemptions were granted for swaps and other OTC derivative contracts and for hybrid 
instruments.49 While the CFTC and the exemptions created under it allowed the OTC 
markets in derivatives to continue to develop, it did not address whether or not any 
particular type of transaction, such as a swap agreement, is a futures or an option.50 As a 
result of this omission concerns about legal uncertainty remain.  
On December 21, 2000, Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization 
Act of 2000 (CFMA), excluding hybrid instruments, swap transactions, transactions in 
exempt commodities, and the exemption for commercial markets.51 Each of these 
exemptions and exclusions are determined by issuers of the contracts, depending on the 
nature of the counterparties and the means by which the contracts are entered into.  
The guidelines for OTC derivatives that are exempt from CFTC regulation are based on 
the party that is offering or entering into the contract. The contract or transaction itself, 
however, is not regulated. Also, the SEC has the authority only to regulate the activities 
of broker-dealers. These firms are required to register with the SEC and comply with its 
 
48 Kuserk et al. 
49 Thomas Lee Hazen, "Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, 
Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance," Annual Review of Banking and Financial Law 24 
(2005): 16.  
50 Hazen 16.  
51 Hazen 17.  
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requirements for regulatory reporting, minimum capital, and examination. However, U.S. 
securities laws do not apply to a broker-dealer’s entire organizational structure, which 
may also include a holding company and other affiliates.52 The SEC has limited 
authority, because its jurisdiction extends only to to the activity of broker-dealers that 
engage in both securities and derivatives activities. 
Regulation of OTC Derivatives 
Current regulation of the OTC derivatives market consists of government 
regulators and non-government regulators. Non-government regulators include industry 
standards setting organizations like the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA), and the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (CRMPG).53. In the 
financial sector, government regulators include the Federal Reserve (Fed), the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodities and Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC). Although, the OTC derivatives market is not directly regulated by 
government agencies, the primary participants like large banks and securities firms, are 
directly regulated. Therefore, they have an obligation to make sure banks and securities 
firms are operating in a safe environment.  
Regulation of Derivate Markets 
Public Regulation Private Regulation 
The Federal Reserve ISDA 
The SEC Group of Thirty 
The CFTC Derivative Policy Group 
The NFA DPC  
Counterparty Risk Management Group  
FASB 
Credit Rating Agencies 
52 Kuserk et al.  
53 Matthews and Rusinko 342.  
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Industry setters like ISDA and CRMPG, play a significant role in derivatives 
regulation. These groups evolved as a result of gaps in OTC standards and regulation, and 
from complaints by end users. Matthews and Rusinko agree that “a feature of the OTC 
derivatives market is its lack of formal regulators and almost total reliance on these 
industry standard setters.”54 However, these standard-setting organizations alone are not 
always adequate to solve all problems that arise in the OTC derivatives market. For 
example, one of the most recent problems is the excessive leverage and lack of 
transparency, and can occur in the collapse of a hedge fund.55 Such a collapse and loss 
could pose a threat to the international financial system.  
The OTC derivatives market includes a large variety of transactions and 
customized products, which lack the unifying characteristics of conventional markets. 
The market exists to meet the needs of customers who are interested in particular 
commodities that are not available on exchanges. The variety of OTC contracts reflects 
the variety of individual situations, and unlike the market for exchange contracts the OTC 
market tends to adapt and change quickly.56 In addition, the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 established a number of exemptions and exclusions that apply 
to a variety of transactions and contracts involving various counterparties, commodities, 
and trading arrangements.57 
Growth of Private Oversight  
 
54 Matthews and Rusinko 342. 
55 Matthews and Rusinko 342. 
56 Kuserk et al.  
57 Kuserk et al.  
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Trading on exchanges has been facing increasing competition from the OTC 
markets. In order to sustain the rapid growth of OTC derivative markets, market 
participants have developed innovative ways to try to reproduce the benefits of 
exchanges, but at lower costs and in a decentralized way.58 The recent trend has been 
toward increased privatization of derivatives regulation, with trading volumes shifting 
from exchanges to OTC transactions. Private regulators have grown in strength through 
the acquisition of policy-making functions and legitimacy, and through economic 
strength.59 Industry self-regulation and market-based supervision are widely accepted. 
This is significant because by influencing standards and practices, the private for profit 
sector is affecting public policy as well.60 
Competition exists in OTC markets among public regulators and private 
regulators.61 By choosing where and how to structure a contract, participants weigh the 
costs and benefits of different regulatory and legal enforcement systems. Various types of 
public and private regulation produce the benefit of confidence and stability in financial 
institutions and markets. As a result, the private sector has a large demand for regulation 
and enforcement.  
An important factor behind the growth of the OTC markets has been the 
development of private standard-setting bodies, like the International Swap and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA).62 This organization has developed a master agreement 
 
58 Randall S. Kroszner, “The Supply of and Demand for Financial Regulation: Public and Private 
Competition Around the Globe,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium on Global Economic 
Integration: Opportunities and Challenges, 25 August 2000 (Wyoming).  
59 Kroszner 2000.  
60 Eleni Tsingou, “Transnational Policy Communities and Financial Governance: The Role of Private 
Actors in Derivatives Regulation,” Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation CSGR 
Working Paper (2003): 4.  
61 Kroszner 2000.  
62 Kroszner 2000. 
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which provides standard definitions of terms used in OTC derivatives and guidelines for 
the formulation of contracts.63 Contracting parties in these markets agree to follow the 
definitions even though the contracts are individually-tailored. In this way, 
standardization is achieved but specific contracts can be more flexible than those traded 
on an exchange. 
Another form of private regulatory structure is an “innovative firm structure,” 
which has played a significant role in the evolution of the OTC markets. The Derivatives 
Product Company (DPC) was invented so that participants in the OTC markets can limit 
counterparty risk.64 DPCs are separately capitalized special purpose vehicles with high 
credit ratings. Their purpose is to ensure that banks with a relatively low rating can still 
take part in the OTC market through these special purpose vehicles.65 
In the OTC markets, the rating agencies have an important certification role. 
These rating agencies are not guarantors like a clearinghouse, but instead they are 
effective regulators in setting standards for capital, collateral, and conduct, like 
clearinghouses and government regulators, but do not have a direct financial stake in the 
transactions.  
 Additionally other organizations and agencies play a role in regulating and 
monitoring derivative markets. One such organization is The Group of Thirty, which was 
formed in 1978. It is an international association of bankers and former government 
officials which develops supervisory practices and capital requirements for banks.66 In 
 
63 Kroszner 2000. 
64 Kroszner 2000. 
65 Jen Nystedt, “Derivative market competition: OTC markets versus organized derivative exchanges”, 
Policy Development and Review Department IMF Working Paper (2004). 
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July 1993, the Group published ‘Derivatives: Principles and Practices’. The study was the 
first comprehensive effort to explain what the industry has learned and to broaden 
awareness of the more successful management practices.67 It provided 20 
recommendations for both dealers and end users. Some of the recommendations reflected 
practices that were already in widespread use, others represented choices between 
alternative practices, while still others represented emerging practices followed by some 
participants. 
The Derivatives Policy Group was organized in 1994 by the leading investment 
banks on Wall Street to respond to the public policy issues raised by the OTC derivatives 
activities of unregulated affiliates of SEC registered broker dealers and the CFTC’s 
registered futures commission merchants.68 The group worked with the SEC and the 
CFTC to issue a report in March 1995, to establish a framework for voluntary oversight 
of the OTC derivatives activities of securities firms. The framework consisted of four 
interrelated components: management controls; enhanced reporting; evaluation of risk in 
relation to capital; and counterparty relationships 
The Counterparty Risk Management Group was established in 1998 by a group of 
12 major commercial banks to address issues related to the near collapse of the Long 
Term Capital Management hedge fund. The firm’s derivatives strategies played an 
important role in the firm’s difficulties. The group provided recommendations to promote 
strong practices in counterparty credit and market risk management.69 The objectives of 
the group were endorsed by the Federal Reserve, the SEC and the Treasury Department. 
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The groups’ recommendations were a response to market disruptions and provided 
improvements in market-wide practices and conventions in a collective manner.70 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is a private sector 
organization which functions as the accounting standard-setting organization. The SEC 
has formal oversight responsibilities for the FASB and consults closely with the FASB in 
the accounting standards-setting process.71 In 1998, the FASB issued Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (SFAS 133), “Accounting for Derivatives 
Instruments and Hedging Activities”. Statement 133 requires that parties report all of 
their derivatives as either assets or liabilities in financial statements and measure those 
instruments at their fair market value.72 The statement requires that any change in the fair 
value of derivatives be reported in the earnings in the period charged.  
Formation of ISDA 
Historically, derivatives markets have been subject to the same types of public 
regulation as securities markets. However, there has been a shift in recent years from 
derivatives transactions subject to public regulation to those subject to private 
regulation.73 The OTC derivatives markets are dominated by private legal rules, specified 
in one or more form documents incorporated into derivatives contracts. The most 
common source of private regulation is the documentation of transactions by ISDA.74 
ISDA is a global trade association representing the leading market participants in the 
OTC derivatives industry. 
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Founded in 1985, ISDA was initially set up to help the young industry establish a 
legal groundwork for over-the-counter swaps. ISDA's early initiatives were limited to 
creating the legal backdrop necessary for the swaps business.75 Later on, ISDA created 
the master trust agreement for swaps that is still in use today; it also pushed for laws to 
protect the practice of netting in case of bankruptcy.76 ISDA has produced several 
generations of standardized language and master forms used by most market participants. 
ISDA has continually revised its forms to reflect changing products, market practices, 
and laws. Although ISDA is a trade association, not an independent research institution, it 
has performed a valuable social function by increasing each market participant's 
understanding of legal risks.77 ISDA has also gone further by actually reducing risks. The 
agency was the major force behind explicit international acceptance of netting. Hu 
explains that “netting occurs when two parties who have entered into multiple derivative 
transactions with each other aggregate all such transactions in the event of bankruptcy, 
thereby reducing credit risk.”78 ISDA obtained legal opinions on the netting issue from 
lawyers in most industrialized nations, drafted contractual provisions applying netting, 
and facilitated consistent statutory changes. 
The central document used by most derivatives market participants is the ISDA 
Master Agreement (the current version is the amended 2002 ISDA Master Agreement). 
ISDA created this form document in 1987 and over time has added provisions and 
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created supporting documents.79 The ISDA Master Agreement is singed before any 
parties enter into any derivatives transactions. These documents specify the obligations 
and representations of each party, and the relevant events of default and termination.80 
They also define the market conventions to be followed in derivatives transactions. Then, 
once the Master Agreement is executed, parties enter into derivatives transactions after 
reaching an oral agreement based on a written term sheet. After this agreement, the 
parties sign a confirmation of the terms of the specific transaction. This confirmation, 
together with the ISDA Master Agreement and Schedule, form the body of private law 
governing the derivatives transaction.81 These form documents have adjusted rapidly to 
reflect changes in practices among market participants, and ISDA quickly has developed 
form documents to be used with new transactions. For example, in 2002 ISDA published 
a list of credit derivatives definitions, including a detailed description of six credit events, 
a draft confirmation, and commentary.  
 ISDA’s definitions and subsequent supplements “have been drafted through 
inclusive consultation of market participants including dealers and end users.”82 These 
definitions have helped shape the market. Additionally, the Master Agreement and 
definitions can be incorporated into confirmations relating to derivatives. This allows 
parties to a transaction to use a short form confirmation containing only economic and 
deal-specific terms relating to that transaction, while the standard terms in the Master or 
definitions remain unchanged.83 The purpose of this type of structure is to provide market 
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participants with a documentation tool that is able to deal with issues occurring from 
derivative transactions, efficiently and cost-effectively. All ISDA documentation allows 
parties to add different elections and to make amendment or additions in the 
confirmation. The definitions also provide for fallbacks which apply in cases where 
parties did not otherwise specify something. An example would be of election elements, 
such as minimum amounts of payment required to a failure by the reference entity to 
make a payment for its obligations.84 
Derivatives Product Company 
Another structure that represents the growth of private regulation is the innovative 
firm structure. Clearinghouses have been successful in managing and controlling risk for 
exchange-based trading, however, they have been facing increasing competition from the 
growth of the OTC market. The benefits of derivatives traded on exchanges are the cost 
of standardizing contracts to make them more liquid; however recent advances in 
financial theory and technology have changed this trade-off from the OTC market.85 
Innovations in risk management have increased the ability to monitor credit risk of 
counterparties and have enhanced the roles or rating agencies to monitor credit quality. 
Also, new techniques have increased demand for tailored products for hedging firm-
specific risk and have allowed for the creation of new sophisticated products.86 
These forces have led to a rise of a new type of organization, the derivatives 
product company (DPC). This structure has been developed to provide the benefits of an 
exchange-clearing system while preserving the flexibility and decentralization of the 
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OTC market.87 Credit agencies play an important certification role as third-party monitors 
in OTC markets. The rating agencies are not guarantors like clearinghouses. Rating 
agencies are important for setting standard for capital, collateral, and conduct without 
having a financial stake in the transactions. Because of a large number of bankruptcies in 
the OTC market in the late 1980’s and 1990’s, there was increased concern about credit 
risk.88 As a result, market participants worked with credit rating agencies to develop a 
new vehicle to address credit risks. The DPC was created to get a high credit rating while 
minimizing the amount of capital that is contributed by a sponsor or parent firm.  
Kroszner explains that Moody’s believes a way to structure a DPC is by a “reliance on 
mirrored transactions to eliminate market risk by pass[ing] it back to the sponsor.”89 
Rating agencies give a large degree of flexibility to market participants to develop 
methods for fulfilling the requirements for a high credit rating.  
A DPC’s structure involves hedging their market risk, monitoring and measuring 
credit risk, and prepackaging and privatizing bankruptcy procedures to reduce uncertainty 
about how counterparties will be affected if the first two procedures fail.90 The credit 
agencies and greater sophistication of risk assessment models have set standards and 
encouraged innovations to reduce costs and the likelihood of failure in the OTC market. 
The DPC’s and the innovations supporting growth of the OTC market have provided an 
important source of competition for the exchanges and demonstrate the role of private 
regulation in its ability to set standards and provide progress.  
Public Regulation 
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In contrast to private rules, legal rules generated by public entities have a much 
different past. Culp and Mackay explain that “financial regulation in the United States 
comes in two varieties: institutional and functional.”91 Institutional regulation is 
regulation of the different kinds of enterprises involved in financial markets and 
intermediation. Functional regulation is regulation of financial instruments and markets 
according to the underlying economic function they perform. Derivative transactions are 
regulated within this framework and since they involve many types of institutions and 
functions, derivatives regulation can be complex. The SEC and the CFTC are viewed as 
"functional regulators," because they dedicate most of their resources to regulating 
products and markets rather than the users of those products and markets.92 
Securities Exchange Commission 
Securities trading in the US is regulated by an independent federal authority - the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Established in 1934 in the aftermath of 
October 1929 financial crisis, the SEC was the first federal agency devoted to the 
regulation of financial markets.93 The SEC regulates the issuance of securities broker-
dealers and the trading of outstanding securities under the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934.94 Also, because of the SEC's asset by asset approach, there is no offset for hedges. 
Under this regulation, it is prohibitive for SEC registered broker-dealers to do a 
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derivatives business, and firms have had to establish subsidiaries outside of SEC 
jurisdiction95 
In December, 1997 the SEC proposed to bring unregulated subsidiaries under a 
modified regulation called broker-dealer-lite.96 The modified regulations were available 
for OTC derivative subsidiaries that deal only with large institutional counterparties. The 
broker-lite proposal has also produced some confrontation from the CFTC, who thinks 
that they should be regulating these derivatives subsidiaries. Stoll explains that “a 
focused approach to SEC capital regulation would require the portion of the broker dealer 
holding insured customer accounts to have solid collateral and to be transparent.”97 The 
remainder of the broker dealers would be unregulated or subject to broker-dealer “lite” 
regulation.  
The SEC regulates all securities traded on national securities exchanges. Several 
exchange-traded derivatives fall under the legal classification of securities, including 
currency options, stock options, and options on stock indexes. The SEC’s regulation of 
these products and exchanges include transparency and price reporting requirements, 
anti-manipulation regulations, position limits, audit trail requirements, and margin 
requirements.  
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) was formed with the 
passage of the Commodity Futures Trading Act by Congress in 1974. This Act extended 
regulation to all futures trading and created a federal regulatory agency, CFTC, for 
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commodities trading that was similar to the SEC.98 The CFTC has jurisdiction over all 
commodity futures contracts, including options and futures. Its functional regulations 
include minimum capital requirements, reporting and transparency requirements, anti-
fraud and anti-manipulation regulations, and minimum standards for clearinghouse 
organizations.99 Over time, Congress has increased its regulatory power, but CFTC’s 
authority to regulate doesn’t include certain financial derivatives. In 2000, Congress 
passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which excludes identified 
banking products, including covered swap agreements, from regulation by the CFTC.100 
Kaza explains that the Act gives the CFTC authority for “diminishing, 
eliminating, or preventing action defined as excessive speculation in any commodity 
subject to the rules of contract markets or derivatives transaction execution facilities that 
cause sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in price.”101 The 
CFTC has the authority to exempt transactions such as spreads, arbitrage, or from fixing 
limits to transactions or positions different from limits fixed for other transactions or 
positions. The CFTC is required to consider the costs and benefits of any proposed 
regulation. The costs and benefits are evaluated in terms of protection of market 
participants and the public; the efficiency, competitiveness and financial integrity of 
futures markets; price discovery; sound risk management practices; and other public 
interest considerations.102 Congress also prevented the CFTC from exercising regulatory 
authority on hybrid instruments. The CFTC is required to “consult with and seek the 
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concurrence of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System concerning the 
nature of the hybrid instrument before commencing a rulemaking or making a 
determination about any identified banking product.103”
Approaches to Derivative Regulation 
The following section will discuss three different approaches to regulation within 
the derivatives market. The first approach is a framework of increased government 
regulation that is focused on creating legislation that will prevent risks, increase internal 
control measures, and increase corporate disclosures. The next approach calls for 
deregulation and reliance on market forces to oversee the derivatives market. This 
framework supports greater control for market participants in managing suitability, risk 
capitalization, and internal risk management. The final approach discusses the need for 
the private sector to oversee and regulate the derivatives market. This framework relies 
on the role of private standard setting agencies that can manage risks by creating choice, 
standardization, and stability. The reasons why this approach is more effective in the 
OTC markets is described.  
Argument for Greater Regulation 
Regulation of financial markets protects public interest by protecting investors 
and guarding against systemic risk. Stoll believes that “regulation is justified because it 
protects investors who are uninformed and unskilled.”104 A second basis for financial 
regulation is systemic risk. Systemic risk is “the risk of widespread default in any set of 
financial contracts that can be linked to a default in derivatives.”105 This means that the 
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failure of one financial institution will cause failures to other institutions and precipitate 
system wide failure. Systemic risk is an externality because the system wide effects are 
not costs for the firm that fails, and therefore have to be corrected by regulation.106 
Regulation of derivatives is important because it prevents systemic risk with 
minimal costs. Henstchel and Smith Jr. explain that “establishing effective public policy 
requires an accurate assessment of not only the risks associated with derivatives, but also 
the benefits offered by the instruments and the potential costs of regulatory 
interference.”107 They believe that regulation is essential because the benefits are 
substantial. These benefits exist because derivative markets have provided corporations 
with financial tools that can be used to manage their exposure to financial prices and 
risks. Henstchel and Smith Jr. support more productive regulatory laws that are “designed 
to limit risks while preserving the efficiency of domestic and international capital 
markets.”108 One regulatory initiative they propose is new and better disclosure 
requirements; another is greater risk-based capital requirements.  
Federal banking regulators also help reduce systemic risks in the markets. They 
oversee all bank activities, including derivatives activities. A primary purpose of Federal 
banking regulation is to ensure the safety and soundness of individual banks and the U.S. 
financial system.109 Bank regulators are authorized to regulate affiliates of banks or bank 
holding companies, regardless of the activities in which they are engaged. Bank 
regulators rely on three primary means to oversee bank activities: reviewing required 
reports; requiring adherence to minimum capital standards; and conducting periodic 
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examinations to verify compliance with reporting, capital, and other regulatory 
requirements.110 Banking regulation help protect the markets from risk.  
Dealer risks and controls are an important area of derivatives for both dealers and 
end-users. Federal banking agencies and the SEC have created programs to evaluate the 
risk management systems of firms under their supervision. By testing and evaluating a 
firm's risk management and controls system, regulators develop an understanding of the 
firm's ability to control overall risk patterns in any given situation. Breeden believes that 
“in the area of financial institutions' risk management systems; it is important for 
regulators to establish standards for minimum practices, but not to codify a particular 
form or approach.”111 Although large investment firms can create models to structure 
their risk profiles, new market entrants, second or third tier dealers, and small companies 
may have failed to make the investment in people, analytics and data systems required to 
manage risk effectively. For derivatives dealers, a critical area is internal controls along 
with their risk management system. In order to avoid scandals and financial losses, 
regulators need to create better policies designed to control internal risk and to insure 
compliance with the law.  
The greatest need for improvement in risk management systems is with the end-
users of derivatives, including corporations, government entities, mutual funds, pension 
funds and other institutional investors. Breeden explains that this can be seen by many 
companies that took losses when interest rates reversed their long decline because these 
companies didn’t have adequate systems for understanding and managing risk.112 When a 
small company decides to enter into derivatives trading that company enters a new area 
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of managing its exposure. Such a company goes into the business of proprietary trading 
and becomes a de facto dealer in derivative instruments.113 However, such a company 
lacks the systems for risk modeling and control that would be present in a major dealer, 
and does not have as many inputs of market information. Therefore, government 
regulators need to closely monitor and have controls in place before making decisions 
that affect the business in such risky ways.  
The inadequacy of internal controls at many end-users of derivatives is another 
problem. Many companies have invested in internal audit departments, and management 
has devoted attention to the development and use of an effective and efficient system of 
internal controls. However, there is much variation in the quality of these programs in 
different companies. Board members are responsible to shareholders for protecting 
against risk. Breeden suggests that effective internal control is accomplished through 
internal action by the directors or senior management, and is tied to the individual 
company's operating structure, and through proper legislation.114 Directors must be 
certain that a company is able to control unacceptable risks of financial statement fraud, 
and unethical or illegal business practices. Breenen believes that this is achieved by 
companies setting high standards for management, established by informed and active 
boards of directors, with government disclosure laws to shareholders and the market.”115 
Disclosure should include the company's exposure and also its policies and practices 
regarding risk management and internal controls  
Improved transparency of parties for corporate disclosures on derivatives is 
another area of improvement. The nature and level of a company's derivatives activity, 
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and the exposure of both its earnings and net worth, are very important disclosure issues. 
For firms with significant levels of exposure, management's discussion and analysis 
should also include comments on the company's practices, controls and strategies.116 The 
right legislation on disclosure will prevent losses to occur without previous disclosure 
that such risks are happening.  
Breenen states that “the growing importance and size of the OTC derivatives 
market makes it vital for Congress to continue to regulate this marketplace.”117 The 
market is global, and new types of transactions continue to evolve in derivatives. As a 
result, regulation should be continuously updated to reflect changes in the market. One 
area for concern is whether the SEC has done enough to allow shareholders and potential 
investors to understand a corporation's derivatives exposure. The issue is whether 
corporate net worth and earnings offers adequate disclosure. Greater legislation may help 
prevent the development of abuses.  
Argument for Greater Deregulation 
The use of technology has accelerated the process of innovation and brought 
about changes in financial markets and institutions that have challenged the effectiveness 
of regulatory frameworks in place in many nations. According to D’arista “a lot of the 
changes in financial structure and regulation that have taken place, have been driven by 
market forces rather than shaped through the deliberative processes of law and 
regulation.”118 The largest, most active and globally integrated markets are the OTC 
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markets. Some researchers and economists support the deregulation of public agencies 
and the rise of market forces in overseeing international markets.  
Flannery supports this view and believes that government regulators should 
minimize their role of regulatory oversight, and transfer more responsibility for financial 
firms' governance to the market arrangements that control other types of public firms.119 
Unlike the government, market forces could apply flexible and firm specific standards, 
which would be more effective than regulation. Growth of the derivatives market has 
shifted combination of government and private oversight. Government regulation tends to 
be less flexible than market oversight, and flexibility is highly valued. The best approach 
is “to rely more on market governance to monitor and control the risks of financial 
failures.”120 
Regulation restricts innovation and shifts valuable resources away from market-
driven risk management, because it is not driven by market forces. Culp and Mackay 
believe that there is no “empirical support has been offered for the notion that current 
regulation, with incremental improvements and enhanced coordination, is inadequate to 
address the risks of derivatives.”121 They explain that over-regulating markets could be 
costly because it might drive derivatives business overseas. Without government 
agencies, the market is a powerful regulator of economic activity and can handle issues of 
suitability, capitalization, and proper risk management. 
One area that has a need for less regulation is suitability. Suitability relates to a 
dealer’s responsibility for determining the extent to which its counterparty understands 
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the risks of the transactions into which it enters.122 A joint statement by the CFTC and the 
SEC in the U.S., and the Securities and Investments Board (SIB) in the United Kingdom 
suggests that dealers transacting with non-dealers should be required to obtain 
information about customers to help ensure suitability. A majority of OTC derivatives 
contracts are done between sophisticated counterparties that are capable of determining 
appropriate contracts. Since these transactions create continuing credit exposures, which 
last the duration of the transaction, participants have a strong incentive to ensure 
counterparty suitability, even in the absence of regulation. Also, Culp and Mackay 
believe that improved accounting and disclosure standards in the industry will make it 
easier for institutions to evaluate suitability without the burden of costly regulations.123 
Culp and Mackay suggest that “legislation imposing a suitability standard would 
unnecessarily restrict derivatives users.”124 Smaller and less sophisticated end users 
would find it more difficult to use derivatives to hedge their risk exposures. Increased 
compliance costs will make some dealers avoid users who are complex and costly to 
document. Less sophisticated institutions will be forced to use more expensive risk 
management methods, creating costs for shareholder and creditors.    
Another area of possible deregulation is risk capitalization. Adequate 
capitalization is important for participation in the OTC market because of the credit-
intensive nature of derivatives. Participants that do not have good capitalization and high 
credit risks will not be active in a competitive derivatives market. There is no need for 
regulation because derivatives dealers have developed internal models for measuring and 
allocating risk in order to maintain adequate capitalization. Culp and Mackay believe that 
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regulation of capital adequacy can best be addressed by allowing institutions to use their 
own risk management models for determining capital adequacy for credit and market 
risks, subject to oversight by supervisors.125 This policy will promote innovation, safer 
and sounder financial institutions, and more efficient allocation of capital. 
Risk management practices are also an important aspect of derivative activities. 
Shareholders, senior management, and outside auditors have strong incentives to ensure 
adequate managerial oversight of risk-taking activities in order to protect and enhance the 
profitability of their institutions. Management of major U.S. dealers has conducted 
internal reviews of risk management procedures and practices. White believes that federal 
regulations requiring a particular level of involvement by management in the oversight 
process is difficult to implement and enforce.126 This is because each institution faces its 
own unique risk exposures and has its own specific risk management processes and 
internal controls. Regulation cannot substitute for effective management oversight. 
The derivatives industry, through its individual members and trade associations, 
has worked to promote information sharing and greater coordination amongst participants 
in derivatives activities to address risks to the industry. As part of standard operating 
procedures, market participants exchange information, coordinate examinations, and 
create policies jointly. Additional coordination of domestic regulators is accomplished 
through the Presidential Working Group and other policy groups. As a result, White 
explains that regulation is not necessary because market participants police themselves.127 
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Less restrictive regulatory changes have reinforced technological improvements 
and have led to lower transaction costs for users entering these markets. Market 
participants are better able to monitor derivative markets with efficient internal controls 
and more flexible firm specific standards. Deregulation creates more incentives for firms 
to be more aware of the risks that they undertake, promoting more surveillance of the 
markets.  
Argument for a Private Oversight Approach to Regulation  
A successful regulatory approach needed to oversee the OTC derivative markets 
should consider the benefits and risks that investors and market participants encounter. 
However, for such an approach to work effectively for the derivatives market, the 
benefits associated with implementing it must outweigh the risks. Based on previous 
research, I believe that a private oversight approach to derivates will work most 
effectively. Although, public regulation is important to monitor the national derivatives 
market, the growth of derivatives on an international scale has limited the benefits of 
such regulation. As a result, the private sector is more successful in maintaining order and 
stability of derivative markets. Private oversight of derivatives markets has created 
choice, standardization, minimization of counterparty risk, and stability. Along with these 
benefits, there have also been costs associated with private regulation such as difficulty of 
enforceability, and operational backlogs. Despite these risks, the advantages of the 
private sector have had significant effects on international markets.  
The private sector is highly needed because a vast and complex public regulatory 
framework stifles innovation and progress. Matthews and Rusinko suggest that there does 
not appear to be a strong demand for additional regulation of the OTC derivatives market 
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in the US.128 They believe that many of the problems that appear in the OTC derivatives 
market can be solved through the analytical, problem-solving and private community that 
produces and trades derivatives. The private sector has an active role in establishing 
standards and guidance for OTC derivatives and risk management, and is more effective 
than regulation. One problem with the regulatory approach is that “regulation by 
government alone is less effective since government regulation is often slow to respond, 
less informed than experts, and obtrusive.”129 This can be seen in the effectiveness of 
rating agencies in dealing with credit risk. Rating agencies are independent entities and 
quickly respond by reporting credit changes within institutions. However, government 
agencies are more reluctant to report this information because they are directly involved. 
Regulation also slows down innovation because flexibility is lost among market 
participants. With the private sector overseeing the markets, flexibility and technological 
growth is more supported and enhanced.  
Complete deregulation also tends to be a less effective form of market regulation. 
Lack of enforceability and sanctions is a disadvantage of relying on the market to police 
changes in derivative markets. Without some form of oversight, the market will be unable 
to deal with credit defaults and risks. As a result, the private sector is needed to help 
avoid systemic risks and market failure, which might affect the whole derivative market.  
Benefits of Private Oversight 
As the growth of the OTC derivatives market has continued to proliferate, the 
adaptation and innovation of the private regulatory sector has magnified. However, such 
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growth has provided many benefits and costs to market participants involved in 
derivatives markets.  
One contribution of the private regulatory sector to the OTC market has been 
choice. The growth of different regulatory agencies and private groups has enhanced 
shareholder choice through enlarging the set of alternative regulatory practices available 
to shareholders and by facilitating shareholders’ ability to make such choices. Investors 
and financial firms have alternatives as to whether to be regulated by a federal regulator 
or a private organization. The ability of firms to choose their regulator has created a 
market for regulation.130 
OTC transactions are not done on exchanges and are therefore not subject to 
exchange rules by public regulatory bodies such as the SEC and the CFTC. This provides 
a lot of freedom and flexibility for investors and end users who utilize OTC derivatives. 
There are no capital requirements and participants have the flexibility to structure these 
transactions in many different ways. This flexibility is important to private regulators 
because they do not put heavy restrictions on OTC transactions. Instead, private 
regulators have created a standardized structure for legal documentation of derivative 
transactions. This standardization does not limit the types of contracts that can be made 
and it doesn’t make rules for what kinds of transactions are acceptable. In contrast, 
private regulation provides legal documentation to prevent against counterparty risk and 
to provide a clear framework for entering into OTC transactions.  
A large part of this contribution has been made by ISDA. The creation of a Master 
Agreement and a set of definitions for derivative contracts have helped create 
standardization. Parties that enter into OTC transactions know ahead of time the types of 
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legal language and concepts they will include and negotiate on. As derivative innovations 
have been introduced into the market, ISDA has been able to adapt and innovate as well. 
The organization has made changes to confirmations and definitions to accommodate the 
changing and growing market. An important benefit of standard documentation is that 
disputes can be handled faster and more efficiently because of standards put in place on 
contracts. Without ISDA documentation, creating binding contracts between 
counterparties would be difficult. For example, two parties conduct an OTC credit default 
swap without clearly stating legal terms in their contract. When one party defaults and is 
unable to make payments to the other party, they may claim that they are not bound to a 
contract and my terminate it. The other party has not benefited and has not received 
payments. However, with the inclusion of ISDA’s Master Agreement and definitions, a 
default of a party would be clearly explained and the contract would not be disputed.  
The expansion of the OTC market has created a reliance on trade assignments 
called novations. A novation is a cancellation of an existing derivative transaction and an 
assignment of that transaction to a different party. This is beneficial for liquidity and 
price discovery. However, many of these novations were being transferred to different 
parties without consent. As a result, in 2005 ISDA published its Novation Protocol to 
standardize the process of novations and to reduce their backlog.131 Under the protocol 
the transferor must: (i) agree to a price with the transferee for a contemplated novation; 
(ii) make a timely request for consent from the remaining party and provide sufficient 
detail to identify the trade in question; (iii) ensure that the transferee receives a copy of 
the remaining party's consent (if acquired); and (iv) remove the novated trade from its 
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books132 (Raisler 11). ISDA’s protocol was able to create a standardized method for 
handling disputes among market participants. This demonstrates the private regulators’ 
ability to resolve issues relating to changes and innovations of the OTC market.  
The private regulatory sector aids in creating stability and integrity within the 
OTC market. Private and independent credit-rating agencies play a significant role in 
certifying the credit quality of potential market participants. Credit-rating agencies serve 
as third-party monitors that provide public information about the credit worthiness of 
counterparties.  Just like public regulation of exchanges, rating agencies like S&P and 
Moody’s provide transparency, auditing, and monitoring functions.133 
Another contribution of private regulation is the Derivative Product Company that 
helped eliminate counterparty risk for banks. To reduce the risks of entering long-term 
contracts in the OTC market, parties emphasized high credit ratings. This special purpose 
vehicle was set up by banks to achieve a high credit rating and allow banks with low 
credit to participate in the derivative market. A DPC was able to achieve a triple-A rating 
because its capital could not have been touched by creditors of the parent company if it 
became bankrupt.134 The structure ensured that any counterparty risk for a participant 
conducting trading was with the DPC and the risk with the end-user was with the DPC as 
well. With the passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, special 
purpose vehicles were significantly simplified and their legal costs were reduced. 
Although, not as abundantly used today, DPC’s were an important structure for market 
participants that wanted to become active in the OTC derivative market but did not have 
high credit ratings.  
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Private Sector Oversight 
Benefits Risks 
Shareholder choice and alternatives 
Difficulty of enforceability through confirmation 
backlogs 
Flexibility and standardization by ISDA Master 
Agreements Inability to prevent systemic risk 
Stability and integrity through credit agencies 
Formation of private organizations with 
monopoly power 
Reduction of counterparty risk through a DPC   
Risks of Private Oversight 
 The complex and conflicting regulatory system has the potential to impede the 
evolution of derivatives, especially the potential for economies of scale and scope to be 
achieved. If regulation is not clear and concise then it will not be followed by 
participants. Also, private regulation doesn’t hold as much weight as public regulation 
that is enforced more rigorously. Unless private regulation becomes a standard used by 
the industry, like ISDA documentation, it will have a hard time being imposed.  
One example of the difficulty of enforceability of private regulation can be seen 
in the ISDA confirmations backlog. With the growth of the OTC market using ISDA 
confirmations to record and legally bind parties to contracts, there has been a large 
amount of outstandings. When a trade is done over-the-counter a confirmation is issued 
by one of the parties, usually a broker/dealer. In T+3 days both parties need to sign the 
confirmation to legalize the trade. However, with the large volume of trading, double 
signed confirmations have taken greater than T+30 days to approve. This creates risk for 
counterparties because if a credit event happens within that time and the confirmation is 
not signed, one party may claim that they are not legally bound by the contract. In 2005, 
in an effort reduce such risks the Federal Reserve conducted meetings with 14 primary 
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dealers to set targets to reduce outstanding confirmations. The goal was to reduce 
outstanding greater than 30 days by certain targets at appropriate deadlines.  
One solution proposed for the industry to maintain progress towards backlog was 
a greater reliance on post-trade automation. The Depository Trust and Clearing 
Corporation (DTCC) was developed to help investors and fund managers with derivatives 
matching and confirmation service. DTCC uses an electronic matching platform called 
Deriv/SERV to match confirms and trades to reduce operational risk associated with 
manual processing.135 This service allows confirmations to be processed within T+3 days 
and is more efficient than a manual process. Greater reliance on DTCC among 
broker/dealers and investors would reduce confirmation backlogs as well as risks.  
Another aspect that can create risks within the private sector is a monopoly of 
standard setting organizations. Although ISDA’s standard form derivatives 
documentation can be cost reducing, the organization can create a monopoly on the 
creation of legal rules. According to Partnoy, “one explanation for ISDA’s dominance is 
that ISDA is simply more efficient than other rule providers, and that the economies of 
providing standard form contracts naturally will lead to single provider.”136 Another 
reason is that since ISDA was the first organization to get involved with documentation 
of derivatives, it has created a barrier to entry for any competing providers. A third 
possibility is that a few dealer members of ISDA are exercising market power in creating 
legal rules. However, there might also be cause for concern if ISDA continues to be the 
sole provider of legal rules for derivatives contracts. One reason might be because a few 
major dealers control the production of legal rules, and the form agreements they use are 
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written to benefit dealers in dealer-to-dealer contracts, or are constructed to advantage 
dealers in dealer-to-end-user contracts.137 The leadership of ISDA is dominated by a 
small number of major dealers. In contrast, end-users of derivatives are much more 
numerous, and therefore face collective action problems in creating a plausible set of 
alternative legal rules. End-users are not entitled to vote on ISDA decisions, and do not 
have any role in formulating legal rules. However, even given ISDA’s domination, 
individual dealers have incentives to compete for derivatives business, and if end-users 
value particular contract provisions, individual dealers can capture business by amending 
their forms.138 If the legal rules were fixed and non-negotiable, dealers and end-users still 
could negotiate based on price. The trend to privatizing legal rules in the derivatives 
industry is likely to continue, and ISDA is likely to be the dominant provider of legal 
rules 
As financial markets continue to go global, attempts to impose a single regulatory 
framework are likely to fail. Institutional regulation along with competition among 
different legal jurisdictions around the world will continue to expand. The task for 
regulators is not to form one massive world-wide regulatory approach but rather to enter 
into agreements under which regulation by private regulators will be acceptable.139 The 
regulatory system should broad based with greater emphasis on the private sector and the 
deregulation of government oversight. The private regulation is able to quickly and 
effectively respond to changes in the market and it allows innovation to prosper among 
OTC derivatives.   
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Conclusion 
Derivative markets have grown tremendously over the past several years and 
continue to evolve and innovate. The global market for OTC derivatives amounted to 
$111 trillion in December 2001 up from $72 trillion in June 1998140. The increase 
represents an average yearly rise of 11.4 percent. In order to maintain this growth and to 
create stability within the markets, proper regulatory approaches need to be implemented. 
Economists and researchers have proposed several types of frameworks that they believe 
will be effective in monitoring the derivatives markets. This paper suggested three 
possible approaches: greater public regulation, deregulation and reliance on market 
forces, and reliance on the private sector to regulate the markets. I believe that the most 
effective regulatory approach to derivative markets is private sector oversight. The 
private sector is efficient in quickly responding to changes and innovations within the 
market and is able to create stability and standardization through its various agencies. The 
benefits described above suggest that private regulation is capable of aiding the growth 
and evolution of the OTC markets into the future.  The growth of the private sector in 
derivatives regulation is likely to continue because of the wide acceptance and use of 
industry standard organizations and policy groups, which have added liquidity and 
standardization to the market. 
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